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This piece provides an epilogue to the Forum on European security following the UK EU 
Referendum. The EU has been a centrepiece in ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?dŚĞƉŝĞĐĞĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚat 
Brexit presents the prospect of a major rethink in the aims, ambitions and conduct of British 
diplomacy and defence. 
From the perspective of third parties  W and most especially for the EU and its member states 
 W the reaction to the prospect of Brexit has been no less clear and the impact on European 
security no less certain. The piece highlights how contributors to this Forum all share the 
assessment of an uncertain future whether discussing bilateral relationships, the impact on 
the EU and NATO or the political economy of European defence. 
This Forum illustrates that it will be a European security and defence future of considerable 
uncertainty. A central issue to be resolved will be whether the EU and the UK are able to 
build a strategic partnership that encompasses issues of foreign policy, security and 
defence. 
The UK will also need to recalibrate its key bilateral relationships in Europe and with the 
United States. This creates an ambitious agenda for practitioners alike. 
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 Since the referendum vote in June the majority of attention has focused on what might be 
the future economic relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU) and the 
ƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ƚƌĂĚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚŝƌĚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ŽŶĐĞ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ƚŚĞ h ? dŚĞ
ĨƵƚƵƌĞĨŽƌƚŚĞh< ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ?security and defence policy has been given much less attention. 
The pieces in this forum seek to address this lacuna.  
 
Security and defence policy gives effects to the broader foreign policy aims and ambitions 
for a state. The hŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂĐĞŶƚƌĞƉŝĞĐĞŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ exiting 
the EU presents the prospect of a major rethink in the aims, ambitions and conduct of 
British diplomacy and defence (Whitman, 2016). EĞŝƚŚĞƌWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌdŚĞƌĞƐĂDĂǇ ?Ɛ UN 
General Assembly address in September nor Foreign Secretary ŽƌŝƐ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ?Ɛ 2nd October 
speech to the Conservative Party conference provided sufficient detail on the objectives of 
future UK foreign policy ĂŶĚ ƐŽ ĂůůŽǁ ĨŽƌ Ă ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇ ƐŽůŝĚ ďĂƐŝƐ ƚŽ ĂƐƐĞƐƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
future stance on security and defence policy (May, 2016; Johnson, 2016). The Prime 
DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ƐƉĞĞĐŚŽŶ  ? ?th January 2017 provided a more detailed ƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƵƐŽŶĂ  ‘'ůŽďĂů
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ƌŽůĞ ĨŽƌh< (that will remain outward rather than inward looking) but with 
little fine detail on the future role envisioned for the UK in European security (May, 2017) 
 
From the perspective of third parties  W and most especially for the EU and its member states 
 W the reaction to the prospect of Brexit has been no less clear and the impact on European 
security no less certain. The contributions to this Forum all share the assessment of an 
uncertain future whether discussing bilateral relationships, the impact on the EU and NATO 





There is no precedent for a country choosing to leave the EU. This means that the 
ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ŽĨ ĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ĂŶĚ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĂƌĞ ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ and 
because h ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ Ă ŬĞǇ ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ĚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇ ĂŶĚ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ
policy since 1973. Since the more recent development of a defence dimension of the EU the 
UK has also been a participant in an evolving security and defence policy landscape that now 
encompasses commitments to EU member states and operations in addition to the long-
standing commitments to NATO.  
 
tŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞŚŽůĚĨŽƌƚŚĞh< ?ƐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƉŽůŝĐǇ ?dŚĞh< ?ƐƉƌĞ-accession 
past is not a helpful guide to an alternative future, as the contemporary international 
context is very different from the Cold War environment within which the UK joined the EU 
in the early 1970s. Further, through its current membership of the EU, Britain participates in 
a set of policies that structure relationships between the EU and other states and 
organizations involved in international relations. With Brexit, this set of policies ? covering 
trade, development and foreign policy will need to be to be recalibrated  W and as this issue 
Forum illustrates this in the areas of security and defence. 
 
ůƚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚĂtus in relation to the EU will also require an extensive recalibration 
of its bilateral relationships with both its EU and non-EU European neighbours. As this 
&ŽƌƵŵŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝƚƐĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐŽƚŚĞƌƚǁŽŵĂũŽƌƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ
actors in the EU, France and Germany, and their cooperation in the area of defence 
procurement. The future of Anglo-German and Franco British relations are difficult to 
predict as, respectively, Alice Pannier and Inez von Weitershausen illustrate.  
 
There is no direct ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ EdK ďƵƚit doesĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ
defence diplomacy. The NATO Warsaw Summit commitment to deepen the EU-NATO 
relationship sesĞĂƐƵďƚůĞĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞh< ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵĂƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚŽŶďŽƚŚƐŝĚĞƐŽĨ
that relatŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƚŽĂŶŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞh ?ƐĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
 
The ĂƌĞĂŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞh< ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƉŽůŝĐǇůŽŽŬƐƚŽďĞŵŽƐƚĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ
is in its relationship with the United States. The election of President Trump has introduced 
a considerable ĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇŝŶƚŽǁŚĂƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚŚĞh< ?ƐŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚďŝůĂƚĞƌĂů
security relationship Ɛ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ h^ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ŵŽƐƚ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ
bilateral relationship since 1945 any substantive ongoing ĂůƚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂů
relatioŶƐŚŝƉ ? ǁŽƵůĚ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ Ă ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ h< ?,ĂǀŝŶŐ ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ƚĂŬĞŶ ƚŚĞ
decision to depart from the EU, which has been one of two pillars upon which Britain has 
built its role in the world since 1973, a diminished relationship with the US would shake the 
transatlantic relationship pillar.  
 
Negotiating the exit from the EU itself now occupies extensive diplomatic and political 
bandwidth for at least the next two years (possibly as much as a decade) ? capacity which 
will be hard-pressed to also focus on the other extensive and pressing set of security 
challenges currently faced by the UK. This includes the relationship with Russia which, as 
Tracey German highlights, the UK found to be challenging even prior to the invasion of the 
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.  
 
Aside from negotiating its own exit from the EU the UK also has to determine its own 
strategic objectives for its future relationship with the EU  W including the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The EU will 
ƌĞŵĂŝŶ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌ ĂŶĚ ŵŽƐƚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ĨŽƌ ŐŽŽĚƐ ĂŶĚ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ
foreseeable future. Consequently the political and economic stability of the EU will be a 
first-order concern for the UK. However, the degree to which the UK will be associated with 
ƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞh ?Ɛ^WŝƐŚŝŐŚůǇƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ.  
 
Membership of the EU has provided the UK with significant efficiencies for the UK in 
enabling it to address a wide range of policy issues via a multilateral format with 27 other 
European countries. The EU has provided a forum for the resolution of interstate 
disagreements between its members, the ironing out of differences with other European 
states and the pursuit of collective policies and positions on issues of common concern. The 
UK will want to ensure that it is not frozen-out of influence on the future strategic priorities 
of the EU and Europe more generally.  
 
dŚĞƌĞŵĂǇ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ďĞŵŽƌĞƉƌŽƐĂŝĐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞh< ?ƐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƉŽůŝĐǇ ?
As Mark Weber and David Dunn note ƚŚĞƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇŽǀĞƌƚŚĞh< ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŐƌŽǁƚŚƉŽƐƚ-
Brexit raises the question as to whether the UK will be able to keep to its current 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ƐƉĞŶĚ  ?A? ŽĨ 'W ŽŶ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? dŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ
ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ĂƐ DĂƚƚŚĞǁ hƚƚůĞǇ ĂŶĚ ĞŶ tŝůŬŝŶƐŽŶ ĂƌŐƵĞ ? ŝƐ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ
ĂĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ Ɛŝngle market. Altering that status will see the landscape of defence 
procurement policies in Europe altered and a more complicated context for the operations 
of both the UK and other European major defence contractors. 
 
The question of the territorial integrity of the UK has also been raised by the EU referendum 
vote. With the electorates of Scotland and Northern Island voting to remain within the EU  W 
and contrary to the position of the English and Welsh electorates  W ƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞh< ?Ɛ
political order has been called into question. The assertive position of the First Minister in 
Scotland that the territories existing status within the EU should remain unaltered is 
contradictory to the position of the UK government in Westminster.  
 
The situation with Northern Ireland is additionally complicated with political parties dividing 
along sectarian lines as to whether to accept the result as binding for the six counties. 
Further, the bilateral relationship between the UK and the Irish Republic which share close 
links, a Common Travel Area, and the Good Friday Agreement (the latter being predicated 
on Britain and the Irish Republic both being EU member states) is now thrown into a state of 
considerable complexity.  
 
Developments in Scotland and Northern Ireland feed into a more general perspective of 
third parties that in exiting the EU the UK will be preoccupied with domestic political affairs 
and have less time for international affairs. And further that Brexit means that British public 
in voting to leave a major regional organisation has opted for a reduced international role 
and declining influence. For the UK defining the ambitions of a post-EU foreign, security and 
defence policy will be a major undertaking for the next decade. 
 
Wider costs (and benefits) of Brexit 
 
The UK ?ƐĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞU does, of course, also impinge on other member states and 
institutions. Mark Weber and David Dunn rehearse the possible costs for NATO (they note 
no benefits) at length. dŚĞ h< ?Ɛ departure from the EU could diminisŚƚŚĞ h ?ƐĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ
foreign policy. As a country with a significant track record in international engagement, and 
Ă ƌĂŶŐĞ ŽĨ ĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ ? ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ? ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ
departure has a high degree of significance for thĞ h ?Ɛ ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? ƚŚĞ h ?ƐĚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇ
 ?ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞh ?ƐƚŚƌĞĞůĂƌŐĞƐƚŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞh ?Ɛ,ŝŐŚZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ǁŝƚŚ
Iran on its nuclear programme might not have been received as seriously in Washington 
without the presence of the UK and EurŽƉĞ ?Ɛ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ŽĨ ŽƚŚĞƌ
international actors. 
 
The UK has also played a contributing ƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞh ?Ɛ^WŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŶŽƚĂďůǇĂůĞĂĚŝŶŐ
role in the anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia in providing the Operational 
Headquarters for Operation Atalanta. The UK ?ƐĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ^WŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ?/ƚ has 
seen the CSDP as a key instrument to create capabilities for crisis and conflict management 
not possessed by other organisations such as NATO. It has also seen it as a vehicle through 
which to strengthen other Membeƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐto thereby boost European 
defence  ?ĂŶĚƚŽďĞƚƚĞƌ ƐĞƌǀĞ EdK ?ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐ ƚŚŽƐĞŽĨ ƚŚĞ h ?by providing 
experience for countries to deploy and sustain their forces overseas for extended periods in 
combination with other nations.  
 
The UK ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶh foreign, security and defence policy can also be read less favourably 
 W and so its departure from the EU represents an opportunity for other member states. It 
has held back the development of the CFSP by seeking to preserve its intergovernmental 
mode of operation. The UK has opposed reforms proposed to the CFSP during the 
Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaty negotiations which would have strengthened decision 
making within ƚŚĞ&^W ?dŚĞh< ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĂŶhĚĞfence policy and 
capability shifted from that of being a leader to that of a laggard. The CSDP has not been a 
ĐŽƌĞ ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ůĂƐƚ ĚĞĐĂĚĞ ? dŚĞ h< ?Ɛ
most recent five-yearly Strategic Defence and Security Review made no substantive 
ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ^W ĂƐ Ă ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ŝƚƐ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
security and defence. On the operational aspects of the CSDP, Atlanta notwithstanding, the 
UK has not been willing to engage at a level of significant scale and scope with CSDP military 
operations.  
 
The UK has also vetoed modest proposals for the development of the CSDP supported by 
the other Member States. The UK has been resistant to proposals to further deepen the 
institutionalisation and resources of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and hindered its 
development. The UK has also vetoed the creation of a permanent military EU operational 
headquarters which is supported by a number of other EU Member States including France 
and Germany who have revived this idea since the June referendum vote.  
 
What future for European security and defence after Brexit? 
 
This Forum illustrates that it will be a European security and defence future of considerable 
uncertainty. A central issue to be resolved will be whether the EU and the UK are able to 
build a strategic partnership that encompasses issues of foreign policy, security and defence 
alongside access to markets and migration. A failure to build a strong EU-UK relationship will 
have spill-over consequences for the broader European security order.  
 
The UK will also need to recalibrate its key bilateral relationships in Europe and with the 
United States. This creates an ambitious agenda ƚŚĂƚ ǁŝůů ƚĞƐƚ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ
diplomacy to its limits.  
 
Pity the poor analysts of European security and defence who will face considerable 
challenges in explaining and understanding what will inevitably be a shifting landscape of 
policy and practice. Capturing this change whilst mapping continuity will be a formidable 
undertaking. The contributions in this Forum provide early indications as to the key 
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